In this paper, we consider a dynamic asset pricing model in an approximate fractional economy to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection and past information. Our newly developed model features not only in terms with a controlling shareholder who diverts a fraction of the output, but also the good (or bad) memory in his budget dynamics which can be well-calibrated by a pathwise way from the historical data. We find that poorer investor protection leads to higher stock holdings of controlling holders, lower stock returns, lower interest rates, and lower stock volatilities if the ownership concentration is sufficiently high. More importantly, by establishing an approximation scheme for the good (or bad) memory of investors on the historical market information, we conclude that the good/bad memory would increase/decrease both real stock returns and interest rates while the equilibrium balances the economy by preventing investors from benefiting the memory. Our model's implications are consistent with a number of interesting facts documented in the recent literature.
Introduction
The corporation owners are often classified into two types of shareholders-controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The controlling shareholders dominate the corporation (e.g., [16] and [23] ) and then they can divert resources for their private benefits. Therefore, it is very demanding to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling shareholders. It is natural for researchers to try establishing an overarching theory in line with the empirical literature. It is known that investor protection has multitudinous effects on the economy (such as asset prices, consumption, etc.) and this may shed light on how investor protection exactly affects shareholders' stock holdings, stock returns and volatilities, interest rates, etc. On the other hand, depending on the analysis of historical data with memory properties, historical information may have a significant effect on the economy. In this paper, we adopt the effects of both investor protection and past information to develop a theory in an approximate fractional economy with a general equilibrium setting, and then try to emphasize key features of the equilibrium and extensional phenomena with empirical evidence for the economy.
Investor protection in related literature has been studied with different forms under various economy settings. Shleifer and Wolfenzon ( [33] , 2002) assume that entrepreneur is caught for diverting revenue with a probability and then adopt such probability as a measure of the legal protection of investors. Under static two-date economy setting, they reveal that better investor protection leads to lower ownership concentration, larger external capital markets and lager firms in equilibrium, and their model additionally makes a number of general equilibrium predictions which are consistent with developed empirical evidence. Albuquerue and Wang ( [1] , 2008) introduce a parameter to measure investor protection, which captures the role of laws and law enforcement protection of minority investors. With their dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (driven by Brownian motion), they conclude that imperfect investor protection would decrease investor welfare and reduce market value, and the model additionally predicts that weaker investor protection conduces to more incentives to overinvest, higher return volatility, larger risk premia and higher interest rate. Basak et al. ( [4] , 2019) adopt the parameter limiting the controlling shareholder's power over the firm as the protection of minority shareholders. The model contains the dynamics of output, bond, stock and investors' self-financing budget constraints.
By solving both controlling shareholders' and minority shareholders' optimal wealth problems in equilibrium, they draw a conclusion that better investor protection results in lower stock holdings of controlling shareholders, higher stock returns and volatilities, and higher interest rates. For more literature related to investor protection, we refer the reader to [5] , [10] , [14] , [24] for static models, and [11] , [15] for dynamic models.
In reality, under the investor protection case, it is still strongly demanding to consider more general and reasonable models to accord with empirical evidence. This naturally requires considering suitable assumptions and introducing efficient mathematical tools in previous models. To our best knowledge, it has been widely examined by theoretical and empirical evidence that fractional Brownian motions (fBms) are most suggested to capture memory properties of historical financial data. The antipersistent fBm (Hurst index H < 1 2 ) has intermediate memory, whereas the persistent one (Hurst index H > 1 2 ) has long memory (see, e.g. [32] ). Mandelbrot 
and van
Ness ( [27] , 1968) suggest fBms as alternative models for assets' dynamics which allow for dependence between returns over time. Shokrollahi and Kılıçman ( [34] , 2016) provide a new framework for pricing currency options in accordance with the fBm model to capture long-memory property of the spot exchange rate. Fouque and Hu consider optimal portfolio problems under fractional stochastic environment in their recent papers. A first-order approximation of the optimal value is established under the condition that the return and volatility of the asset are functions of a stationary fast mean-reverting fractional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process ( [18] , 2018) as well as a stationary slowly varying fractional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process ( [19] , 2018) respectively. One can refer to [6] , [22] , [25] , [28] for more researches on fBms. As far as we know, few literature related to investor protection contains memory properties driven by fBms, and hence, we intend to develop a new model which not only contains investor protection but also relates to memory properties.
In fact, fBms can be hardly introduced to the complex economy in [4] which is the most related to our paper. The main reason is that stochastic calculus for fBms is mainly the integral theory based on Wick-product but not usual Itô integrals (see [2] , [6] , [28] ). For one thing, the model based on Wick-product for fBms is much less analytical and tractable for the complex economy.
Hence, we may fail to reach the equilibrium in the economy and to study the effects of investor protection. For another, integrals based on Wick-product for fBms are not pathwise in contrast to Itô integrals for Brownian motions, which implies that "the general state of a company does not really have a noted stock price a priori, but it brings out a number (price) when confronted with a market observer (the stock market)" (see Page 175 in [6] ). Consequently, we could not deal with historical realized financial data in a complex economy in a pathwise way. Therefore, we choose an approximate fBm instead of fBm in the model of our economy:
for standard Brownian motion B, the Hurst index H ∈ (0, 1) and ε > 0, where the parameter √ 2H is introduced to make the following B H t has same distribution with the associated fBm for each t > 0. We note that the process B ε,H t is indeed an approximation of fBm and then inherits the memory properties of fBm. It can be proved (see [35] , [36] ) that when ε tends to 0, the process B ε,H t converges in L 2 to the process
which is the main memory part of fBm and can be viewed as a good approximation of the fBm for large times (see Theorem 17 in [30] ). On the other hand, the process B ε,H t is a classic Itô integral with analytical expression (see (2.1)), and hence in such an economy we can achieve studying the effects of investor protection and apply the historical realized financial data in the economy in a pathwise way. Furthermore, it is known that the process B ε,H t degenerates to Brownian motion for H = 1 2 and hence such a fractional economy contains the usual economy.
We note that the process B ε,H t has been used in theoretical study as well as practical applications. Dung ( [12] , 2011) applies the approximate fBm for an approximate fractional Black-Scholes model and then the European option pricing formula is found. Because of the semimartingale property, the effect of the approximate fBm on such pricing system is reflected in the Hurst index and is independent of the historical realized stock price. Xu and Li ( [37] , 2015) use the approximate fBm to study a class of doubly perturbed neutral stochastic functional equations driven by fBm. Yue and Huang ( [38] , 2018) introduce the approximate fBm to a general Wishart process and achieve establishing ε-fractional Wishart process. It is known that the new process possesses the approximate memory property inheriting from fBm. On the other hand, applying the new process to the financial volatility theory, the new process extends both the one-dimension CIR process ( [8] ) and the high-dimension Wishart process (see [7] , [13] ). However, it is also difficult to price derivatives by the historical realized stock price. Therefore, it is of much meaning to make use of the historical realized data to obtain the equilibrium and then study the effects of investor protection in such a fractional economy.
In this paper, we consider a dynamic asset pricing model in an approximate fractional economy to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection for minority shareholders and memory properties of financial data. Our model features not only a controlling shareholder who diverts a fraction of output but also the good (or bad) memory which investors obtain from the historical realized output data of the economy in a pathwise way. In line with [4] , we find that poorer investor protection increases stock holdings of controlling holders, decreases stock returns, decreases interest rates, and decreases stock volatilities when ownership concentration is sufficiently high. More importantly, we reveal the economic behavior of the approximate fractional economy in the following aspects: (i) describes the good (or bad) memory of investors on the history market information and then establishes an approximation scheme with pathwise convergence for the memory; (ii) concludes that higher Hurst index shall weaken investor protection and the good/bad memory would increase/decrease both real stock returns and interest rates;
(iii) shows that the equilibrium plays a vital role to balance the economy by preventing investors from benefiting the memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the financial model with investor protection and approximate fBms. In Section 3 we derive the dynamics of asset prices in equilibrium for the approximate fractional economy. In Section 4 we establish an approximation scheme for past information by using the historical realized data of the output and then prove its pathwise convergence. Before we summarizing this paper in Section 6, some numerical results are given in Section 5 to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection for minority shareholders and memory properties of financial data.
Models driven by approximate fBms
Let (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions throughout where F t is generated by a standard Brownian motion W.
Define an approximate fBm W H t with parameter ε > 0 and H ∈ (0, 1) as
where t ≥ 0, α = H − 1 2 and we omit the parameter ε in W H t . By Itô's Lemma, we can express W H t in an equivalent way (or one may refer to [35] for the case 1 2 < H < 1 and [36] for the case
In above approximate fractional probability space, we construct a financial market and consider its economy with investor protection (for more details, we refer to [4] ). We focus on one representative firm standing for amounts of identical firms. The exogenous stream of the output associated with the firm is captured by
where constants µ D and σ D > 0 represent the mean-growth rate (or return) and volatility of the output, respectively.
The shareholders in the firm are sorted into two types-a controlling shareholders C and a representative minority shareholders M . A bond B t and a stock S t traded by the shareholders are respectively normalized to one unit and follow stochastic differential equations:
where r t is the interest rate of the bond; µ t is the mean-return (or return) of the stock; σ t is the volatility of the stock, and all processes r t , µ t , σ t are F t -adapt and are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Furthermore, we assume that the wealth of shareholders C and M at time t, denoted by W Ct and W M t , are made up of portfolios of B t and S t and expressed as following equations:
where,
b it is the number of units of bounds in the shareholder's portfolio;
n it is the number of shares of stocks in the shareholder's portfolio;
x t is the fraction of diverted output which satisfies the investor protection constraint with a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] (interpreted as the protection of minority shareholders)
c it is the consumption of the shareholder i; l i is the fraction of the output paid to the shareholder i as labor incomes;
is assumed to be a pecuniary cost from diverting output with a constant k.
The parameter k captures the magnitude of the cost.
We now turn to constructing shareholders' optimization problems with investor protection.
We assume that shareholders' objective functions are determined by myopic preferences (utility functions) over current consumption c and wealth W :
where ρ > 0 is a time-preference parameter and utility functions are given constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functions
with γ M ≥ γ C > 0. We will see in Sections 3 and 5 that though investors could obtain past information from the historical realized data, the equilibrium ensures the increase of stock returns at the cost of higher interest rates, and then prevents investors from benefiting their memory of the economy. This accordingly reveals that investors should concentrate on current and (possible)
future information instead of past information, and hence it is rational and workable to assume that shareholders' objective functions are described by myopic preferences.
The controlling shareholder C maximizes V C through strategies of the investment n Ct , the consumption c Ct and the diverting fraction x t :
where V C is given by (2.8) in the case i = C, subject to constraints (2.6) and (2.7), and maximum share constraint n Ct ≤ 1. Similarly, the minority shareholder M maximizes V M through strategies of the investment n M t and the consumption c M t :
where V M is given by (2.8) in the case i = M , subject to the constraint (2.6) and maximum share constraint n M t ≤ 1.
In the approximate fractional economy, new characteristics brought by approximate fBms could be explained in two aspects-W t and H. It is seen that W t is the essential difference between the approximate fBm W H t (in the case of H = 1 2 ) and the Brownian motion W
In the case H = 1 2 , expressing (2.2) equivalently as
it is well-known that D t is a Markov process whose increments are independent of past information.
In the case H = 1 2 , rewriting (2.2) equivalently as 12) it is telling that the real return µ D + σ D W t depends on the volatility σ D and the past information W t . In such case W t is the past cumulate information of W t and hence, it could be regard as the cumulate quantity of the approximate fBm's memory on [0, t]. As a result, in the case of H = 1 2 the increment of D t depends only on the information of D t , while in the case of H = 1 2 the increment of D t is correlated to the information of { D s } 0≤s≤t . Similar discussions could be considered for S t in (2.4) and W it in (2.6). However, we shall see in Section 4 that W t can be known in theory and be estimated in practice by using the information of { D s } 0≤s≤t , which is crucial in our fractional models. Furthermore, the Hurst index H also changes the real volatility √ 2Hε α σ D of the output by (2.12). Since there exists ε > 0 small enough such that g(H) = √ 2Hε α is a decreasing function of H in the interval (− 2 ln ε , 1), higher H in general leads to lower volatility of the output. If ε > 0 is extremely small, then the output shall be extremely volatile for H < 1 2 and be quite stable on the contrary for H > 1 2 .
Remark 2.1. When H = 1 2 , the parameter ε disappears in W H t and our models (2.2)-(2.6) degenerate to ones studied in [4] .
Equilibrium with investor protection and approximate fBms
In this section, we solve for shareholders' optimization problems (2.10) and (2.11) in the models driven by approximate fBms and derive investors' optimal strategies and asset price dynamics in equilibrium. To this end, we start from a partial equilibrium setting where processes r t , µ t and σ t are regarded as given processes. Then, making use of market clearing conditions, r t , µ t and σ t are truly obtained in equilibrium.
Using (2.1) and Itô's Lemma we first decompose problems (2.10) and (2.11) into some equivalent but more precise problems. Noting that E t [∼ dW t ] = 0 with some F t -measurable expressions
Hence, the problem (2.10) for shareholder C is equivalent to
And the problem (2.11) for shareholder M is equivalent to
Under a partial equilibrium setting, we obtain investors' optimal strategies which is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. In the model driven by the approximate fBm, the optimal consumptions c * it , the fraction of diverted output x * t and the optimal stock holding n * it for i ∈ {C, M } are given as follows:
and
Proof : As discussed in Section 2, W t is an F t -adapt process and known theoretically by using the information of { D s } 0≤s≤t and we may deal with W t as an exogenous process like D t . Then the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in [4] and so we just sketch the proof.
Solving (3.1) and (3.4) gives (3.6) . Maximizing the quadratic objective function J M in (3.5), we obtain (3.9) where x * t is given latter.
It is easy to see that J c in (3.2) is a quadratic function of x t and
Hence, considering the constrain (2.7), we get x * t (n Ct ) = min 1−n Ct k , (1 − p)n Ct . Substituting
In the case of n Ct ≤ 1 1+(1−p)k , it is obvious that J C1 is a quadratic concave function of n Ct , and there are two possible maximal points for J C1 -n * Ct,1 and n * Ct,3 . In the case of n Ct ≥ 1 1+(1−p)k , J C2 is a quadratic concave or convex function (or even a linear function) of n Ct , but it is clear that there exist three possible maximal points for J C2 -n * Ct,2 , n * Ct,3 and n * Ct,4 . Summarizing aforementioned analysis and searching over above points, we can determine the global maximum and the associated maximum point n * Ct , which gives (3.8) and (3.10)-(3.13). ✷ Remark 3.1. Comparing with Proposition 1 in [4] , the past information W t plays an important and different role under the partial equilibrium setting. It seems that both the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder can benefit from the past information W t . If W t = 0, then by (3.9) and (3.10)-(3.11), the past information W t contributes nothing to investors' shares, which implies shareholders have "no memory" for the past information W t . If W t > 0, then by (3.9) and (3.10)-(3.11), shareholders would acquire more shares through the past information W t , which implies that the past information W t > 0 is a kind of "good memory" for shareholders. Similarly, if W t < 0, then by (3.9) and (3.10)-(3.11), shareholders would acquire less shares through the past information W t , which implies that the past information W t < 0 is a kind of "bad memory" for shareholders.
In the following part of this section, we obtain equilibrium dynamics
We define a standard equilibrium as a set of µ t , σ t , r t , n * it , b * it and c * it (i ∈ {C, M }) satisfying the following market clearing conditions ( [4] )
denote the minority shareholder's share in the aggregate consumption. y t is an important state process to derive equilibrium dynamics and following [4] , we assume and then verify that y t satisfies a form of
where µ yt and σ yt are functions of y t and W t to be determined in equilibrium. Moreover, we also define a similar Sharpe ratio κ t as
Theorem 3.2. In the model driven by the approximate fBm and under the equilibrium conditions
and y t ∈ (0, 1), the shareholders' optimal consumptions c * it (i ∈ {C, M }) are given by (3.6) , and the interest rate r t , the stock mean-return µ t , the stock volatility σ t , the Sharpe ratio κ t , the parameters µ yt and σ yt are given by:
.
(3.27)
The shareholders' optimal bond holdings b * it and stock holdings n * it (i ∈ {C, M }) could be expressed as follows:
and J * C is given by (3.3) and (3.14) with x * t , r t , µ t , σ t given by (3.7),(3.21)-(3.23) and
Proof : Using (2.5), (3.6) and the market clearing conditions (3.16)-(3.18), we have 38) which clearly implies that Applying Itô's Lemma to both sides of (3.38) and then matching the terms of dt and dW t , it is seen that
Then by Substituting y t = 
which together with (3.23) and (3.41) gives (3.24) of the Sharpe ratio κ t .
Applying Itô's Lemma to both sides of
and then matching the terms of dt and dW t again, we just get µ yt and σ yt as (3.25) and (3.27) respectively.
Finally, we turn to derive b * it and n * it (i ∈ {C, M }). It is easy to obtain (3.28)-(3.30) and (3.33)-(3.34). In Region 2, since
, we may rewrite (3.11) as
and then by substituting (3.23), (3.24) and (3.40) for σ t , κ t and W Ct St we obtain
Solving the above equation for n * Ct,2 , we derive (3.32) for n * Ct,2 . In Region 1, as x * t (n * Ct,1 ) = n * Ct,1 (1 − p), we may rewrite (3.10) as 
has at least one zero point in [0, 1]. To this end, using n * Ct,2 ∈ [0, 1] and n * Ct,3 ∈ (0, 1] we could verify that
which implies by the zero point theorem that there exists at least one n * ∈ [0, 1] such that g(n * ) = 0. 
and other parameters given in Theorem 3.2. The stock holding n * Ct could be chosen from n * Ct,i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4). Hence, to obtain n * Ct , we just need to seek the Region j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that
where for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the parameters in J C should be related to Region j.
It is of much importance to note that the equilibrium in Theorem 3.1 may not exist. We give a simple example here. Set H = p = y t = 1 2 , γ M = γ C , k = 2, ρ = σ D = 0.01, which is a special scenario in [4] . Then it is easy to obtain n * Ct,1 = n * Ct,2 = n * Ct,3 = 1 2 and n * Ct,4 = 1.
In Region 1 (or Region 2, Region 3, equivalently), we have
Hence, J C (n * Ct,1 ) = J C (n * Ct,2 ) = J C (n * Ct,3 ) = σ 2 D + 3 16 ρ = 0.0019 and J C (n * Ct,4 ) = ρ 4 = 0.0025. Since 0.0019 < 0.0025, the stock holding n * Ct does not locate in Region 1, 2 or 3.
In Region 4, we have σ t = σ D , µ t = µ D , r t = µ D + 1 2 ρ and Dt
Hence, J C (n * Ct,1 ) = J C (n * Ct,2 ) = J C (n * Ct,3 ) = − σ 2 D 2 + ρ 16 = 5.57 × 10 −4 and J C (n * Ct,4 ) = −2σ 2 D = −2 × 10 −4 . Since 5.57 × 10 −4 > −2 × 10 −4 , the stock holding n * Ct does not locate in Region 4.
Summarizing above discussion, the stock holding n * Ct , as well as the equilibrium in Theorem 3.1, does not exist. However, we shall always consider scenarios where the equilibrium in Theorem 3.1 exists in our paper.
In a perfect economy, the controlling shareholder can not divert output for his private benefit, which is the case p = 1 and denoted by the benchmark economy. Hence, we give the benchmark equilibrium by applying Theorem 3.1 directly.
Corollary 3.1. In the model driven by the approximate fBm and under the equilibrium conditions (3.16)-(3.18) with p = 1 and y t ∈ (0, 1), the shareholders' optimal consumptions c B it (i ∈ {C, M }) are given by (3.6) , and the interest rate r B t , the stock mean-return µ B t , the stock volatility σ B t , the Sharpe ratio κ B t , the parameters µ B yt and σ B yt are given by:
The shareholders' optimal bond holdings b B it and stock holdings n B it (i ∈ {C, M }) could be expressed as follows:
52)
Proof :
The benchmark condition p = 1 implies, by (2.7), that x t ≡ 0 and f (x, D) ≡ 0.
Substituting p = 1 and x B t = 0 into Theorem 3.2, it suffices to obtain n B Ct to complete the proof. Indeed, by setting p = 1 in (3.15) and (3.31), we know that the condition 1 1+(1−p)k = 1 implies n B
Ct could be discussed equivalently in Region 1, and (3.51) is obtained easily. ✷ Remark 3.4. From Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1, it is clearly that the past information W t disappears in shareholders' stock holdings n * Ct and n * M t . This is owning to equilibrium conditions (3.16)-(3.18) and we shall discuss it in Section 5 later. Since the optimal stock holding may not exist in equilibrium with extreme values of exogenous model parameters, n * Ct may appear to be a discontinuous function of y t . However, we shall not consider such a discontinuity in our calibration of Section 5.
Conditions y t = 0 and y t = 1 implies that W M t = 0 and W Ct = 0 respectively. Such related results are practically meaningful, but we can hardly apply those conditions to Theorem 3.1.
Noticing that all equilibrium results in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 are continuous functions of y t ∈ (0, 1) and W t , we shall assume that they are continuous at y t = 0 and y t = 1, which means we take their values at y t = 0 and y t = 1 by considering y t → 0 + and y t → 1 − respectively.
Hence, we extend all equilibrium results to the case y t ∈ [0, 1] in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1.
As y t → 0 implies W M t → 0, we obtain n * M t → 0 and then n * Ct → 1 by n * M t + n * Ct = 1. Now we assume p < 1 and y t is sufficiently small in some interval I = (0, δ) with δ > 0. The fact that n * Ct is a continuous function of y t implies that n * Ct should locate in Region 2 or Region 4. If n * Ct locates in Region 2 for y t ∈ I (which is the only case for p = 1), κ t (y t ) converges to κ t (0) = √ 2Hε α σ D γ C by substituting n * Ct,2 . If n * Ct locates in Region 4 for y t ∈ I, κ t (y t ) converges to κ t (0) = 0. If p = 1, then n * Ct = n B Ct . Similar discussion could be done for the case y t = 1. Finally, by y t → 0 + and y t → 1 − , the equilibrium results for the case y t = 0 and y t = 1 are given by
κ t (0) = √ 2Hε α σ D γ C , n * Ct = n * Ct,2 for p < 1 and y t ∈ I; or p = 1 0, n * Ct = 1 for p < 1 and y t ∈ I σ yt (0) =0,
An approximation scheme for W
In this section, for a fixed T > 0 we use the information { D t } 0≤s≤T to estimate W T by constructing an approximation scheme with pathwise convergence.
Setting Z t = ln D t , it is seen by Itô's Lemma that
Define the approximation scheme as
where n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 with N ∈ N and 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n < · · · < t N −1 < t N = T are the time nodes of the discretization. For simplicity we also assume that ∆t = t n+1 − t n = T /N ≤ 1 for each n.
In the following part of this section, we assume that T, ∆t, ε, H, µ D , σ D are all fixed constants and C p (or C) will denote a nonnegative constant depending only on p whose value may change from line to line. Now we may state the pathwise convergence of the approximation scheme for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
With Theorem 4.1 and the approximation scheme (4.2)-(4.3), we may achieve estimating W t pathwise at the time nodes 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n < · · · < t N −1 < t N = T . For the proof, we first consider several lemmas.
For n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, define an approximation scheme used in definitions of Itô integrals as
for n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, we could estimate their moments and pathwise convergence as the follows. Proof : By definition (4.5), we may rewrite Z t n+1 − Z tn as
Then it is seen that
For p = 1,
and for p > 1,
where 1 p + 1 q = 1 and we use Hölder inequality.
Noticing the definition of W t , we know that W tn − W t (t ∈ [t n , t n+1 ]) possesses a normal distribution with the mean 0 and the variance σ 2 n for all n (here the constant random variables are considered to be normal random variables with variances 0). If we can prove that there exists a nonnegative constant C such that σ 2 n ≤ C∆t, (4.10)
then it is from (4.8)-(4.9) and moment properties of normal distribution that
which just prove the lemma.
Indeed, for each n and t ∈ [t n , t n+1 ], we have
where
It is easy to see by 2(α − 1) ∈ (−3, −1) that
Since ∆t < T and α − 2 ∈ (− 5 2 , − 3 2 ), we have
which clearly entails
Substituting (4.13)-(4.14) into (4.12), we obtain (4.10), which completes the proof. ✷
Then for all δ > 0, there exists a nonnegative random variable K 1δ depending only on δ with
for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof : We first recall that for any nonnegative a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a N ,
In the case p ≥ 3,
which implies by ∆t ≤ 1 that
In the case 1 ≤ p < 3,
Hence it is from (4.15) and (4.16) that for all p ≥ 1
Consequently, by applying Lemma 1 in [20] or Lemma 3.4 in [21] to (4.17), we obtain the statement of the lemma. ✷ 
Then for all δ > 0, there exists a nonnegative random variable K 2δ depending only on δ with
Proof : For k, n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, define
and it is seen by definitions of W t n+1 and W t n+1 that
Since X k+1 possesses a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance satisfying
we get by moment properties of the normal distribution that for all p ≥ 1 there exists a nonnegative constant C p such that
Now by a similar proof of (4.17), it is seen that for all p ≥ 1
which implies by Lemma 1 in [20] or Lemma 3.4 in [21] again that the statement of the lemma holds true. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
For almost all ω ∈ Ω (which we shall omit in our following proof for simplicity) and n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, it is seen from (4.2)-(4.3) and (4.5)-(4.6) that 3) and (4.6))
3, (4.2) and (4.5))
Using the discrete Gronwall lemma (see Lemma 1.4.2 in [31] ), we have
By setting
it is telling that EK p δ < +∞ for all p ≥ 1 and
Finally noticing right side of (4.20) is not related to n, we just prove the theorem. ✷ Remark 4.1. We note here that the approximation scheme (4.2)-(4.3) works in the case H = 1 2 though we do not have to use it to approximate W t . Indeed, since α = H − 1 2 = 0 in the case H = 1 2 , it is obtained from (4.3) that W t n+1 = 0, which clearly implies W t n+1 = W t n+1 for n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
Numerical results
In this section, by numerical results we shall analyse how the memory facts W t and H affect investor protection and asset prices.
Following the work of [4] , we set µ D = 0.015, σ D = 0.13, γ C = 3, γ M = 3.5, ρ = 0.01, k = 3, l C = 0.1, l M = 0.5 as basic parameters for our model. Moreover, we put ε = 0.1 and vary y t from 0 to 1 with the step length 0.01, and other parameters may change in different scenarios.
Past information
The past information W t is a remarkable characteristic in our approximate fractional economy and determines how investors treat the economy at the present time t by using the historical realized data. As we noted in Remark 3.1, "no memory" (W t = 0), "good memory" (W t > 0) and "bad memory" (W t < 0) of the economy could lead to different equilibriums.
Observing the approximation scheme (4.2)-(4.3), there are multiple complex factors determining which case among "no memory", "good memory" and "bad memory" the economy is located in. So we just roughly analyze the past information W t by theoretical and numerical methods.
We set specially ε = 10 −5 or ε = 0.1, the time interval [0, T ] = [0, 1] with ∆t = 10 −3 and some given historical realized data Z as Z 1 (t) =0.015 + 0.02(t − 0.5), in Figure 2 show that it is worth for investors risking volatilities to benefit from returns, which indicates that the past information is a kind of "good memory" for shareholders. Both plane (a) (with parameters H = 0.35, ε = 0.1, Z = Z 1 ) and plane (c) (with parameters H = 0.65, ε = 0.1, Z = Z 2 and Z = Z 3 ) in Figure 2 also show that it is unworthy for investors enduring risks to gain returns, which indicates that the past information is a kind of "bad memory" for shareholders.
Specially, when ε disappears in the economy (i.e. the case of H = 0.5), our economy is driven by Brownian motion with "no memory" properties. In such a economy, investors can not get any useful information from the historical realized data whatever the historical realized data Z behave. Panel (b) in Figure 1 (with parameters H = 0.5 and ε = 10 −5 ) and panel (b) in Figure   2 (with parameters H = 0.5 and ε = 0.1) present that the past information is a kind of "no memory" for shareholders.
Stock holdings and diverted output
Controlling shareholder's stock holding n * Ct is the basic and crucial result in equilibrium. So we start our numerical analysis in equilibrium with Figures 3 and 4 demonstrating the effects of investor protection and Hurst index on controlling shareholder's equilibrium stock holding. We first note here that higher Hurst index H causes lower market volatility as it is seen from Section 2 and Figure 8 that higher Hurst index H leads to lower volatilities of the output and stock. . This is because facing same volatility risk caused by fixed H under both imperfect protection and full protection, the controlling shareholder can divert a larger fraction of output when he owns more shares in the case of imperfect protection, which gives the controlling shareholder an incentive to acquire more shares.
With y t increasing, n * C stays in Region 2 when the controlling shareholder's consumption share is high (y t is low), while n * C switches to Region 1 when the controlling shareholder's consumption share is low (y t is high). In the case of Region 1, besides that investor protection p < 1 urges controlling shareholder to acquire more shares, different Hurst indices result in different acquirements of shares for controlling shareholder. It is seen by panels (a)-(b) in Figure 4 that the higher H (c) p = 1 Figure 4 : Stock holdings n * Ct with different indices p is, the higher n * C tends to be when investor protection is imperfect (which is consistent with the examinations in [9] and [17] ). This is because higher Hurst index H decreases the stock volatility σ H (see Figure 8 ) facilitating controlling shareholder to acquire more shares. In the case of Region 2, it is from (3.32) and (3.51) that p and H do not involve, and then the investor protection constraint and volatility risk do not bind leading to n * Ct | p=i,H=u = n * Ct | p=j,H=v (i, j ∈ {0.6, 0.9, 1} and u, v ∈ {0.35, 0.5, 0.65}, see panels (a)-(c) in Figure 3 and panels (a)-(c) in Figure 4 ). The reason is that holding lots of shares reduces the benefits of diverting the output.
It is from the proof of Theorem 3.1 that the fraction of diverted output x * t is directly related to controlling shareholder's stock holding, which contributes to understanding controlling shareholder's stock holding more precisely. 6 make it much easier to verify when n * Ct lies in Region 1 or Region 2. As discussed in [4] , the kink is the separation of point of Region 1 and Region 2: the constraint x t ≤ (1 − p)n Ct is binding when n Ct is sufficiently small, while the constraint is not binding and controlling shareholder would not steal from himself when n Ct is sufficiently large. Hence, if y t lies to the left-side (right-side) of the kink, then n * Ct stays in Region 2 (Region 1) for imperfect protection.
Similar to what we have discussed in Figures 3 and 4 , the effect of H on the fraction of diverted output for imperfect protection could be considered by Figure 6 in two ways. On the one hand, H has no influence on the fraction of diverted output in Region 2 as we have expected from (3.32) .
On the other hand, higher H leads to higher fraction of diverted output in Region 1, which is because higher H urges controlling shareholder to acquire more shares so that the fraction of diverted output x * t = (1 − p)n * Ct increases. Hence, Planes (a) and (b) in Figure 6 also show that higher Hurst index H (i.e. lower volatility of the economy) shall weaken investor protection for minority shareholder, consistent with the empirical evidence in [3] and [29] . (c) p = 1 Figure 6 : Fraction of diverted output x * t with different indices p depends on investor protect p and Hurst index H. However, n * Ct in general is non-monotone in p or H. The investor protection parameter p has two opposing influences on stock holding n * Ct . Better investor protection prevents the controlling shareholder from diverting the output, while better investor protection extends Region 1 for imperfect protection (Figure 5 ), loosing the role of the cost of stealing. Similarly, Hurst index H affects stock holding n * Ct in two opposing ways. On the one hand, higher Hurst index H may cause lower stock volatility risk (see Figure 8) and in such circumstances the controlling shareholder prefers to own more shares. On the other hand, higher Hurst index H may lead to lower stock excess return (see Figure 9 ) and in such circumstances the controlling shareholder would acquire less shares.
Stock return and volatility
Similar to discussion of the output D t in Section 2 , it is easy to see that the real stock return and stock volatility are µ W t = µ t + σ t W t and σ H t = √ 2Hε α σ t . For the purpose of compare, we also denote the stock excess return by (c) p = 1 Figure 10 :
means that the stock is more volatile in the economy with imperfect protection. The reason may be explained in two aspects: "with imperfect protection the controlling shareholder holds more shares than in the full protection benchmark, and hence is under-diversified" (see [4] ), and the controlling shareholder is less risk-averse than the minority shareholder. The under-diversified and less risk-averse properties make controlling shareholder's wealth and consumption more volatile, which then translates into the stock market. It is seen from Figure 9 that for fixed Hurst index H, the real stock excess return µ H in the economy with imperfect protection is lower than µ H,B in the benchmark economy with perfect protection. As discussed in Figure 3 , the investor protection constraint does not bind (and no output is stolen by the controlling shareholder) in Region 2 resulting in µ H = µ H,B , and the investor protection constraint binds (and a fraction of output is stolen by the controlling shareholder) in Region 1 leading to µ H < µ H,B in general. Figure 10 shows that for fixed investor protect p, higher Hurst index H decreases the real stock excess return µ H . There are two main reasons. On the one hand, it is from the arbitrage-free theory ("there is no such thing as a free lunch" , see, e.g. [26] ) that lower risk leads to lower return, and by analysis in Figure 8 , higher Hurst index H could decreases the real stock excess return µ H . On the other hand, for imperfect protection p < 1, since higher Hurst index H leads to higher fraction of diverted output (Figure 6 ), the controlling shareholder can divert more output for himself, which decreases the real stock excess return µ H .
Effects of past information
It is interesting to notice that the real stock excess return µ H does not depend on W t in equilibrium
The reason could be found by (3.21) and (3.23) : the effect of W t on the real stock return µ W neutralizes the effect of W t on the interest rate r t . Similar results could be obtained for aforementioned stock holdings n * Ct , fraction of diverting output x * t and stock volatility σ t . Hence, the past memory information W t does not benefit shareholders' investing strategies in equilibrium. This implies that shareholders should pay no attention to the past information, which is consistent with the assumption of myopic preferences for investors. However, it is so different by Theorem 3.1 that n * Ct depends on W t under the partial equilibrium setting, which indicates that the equilibrium plays an important role in our economy. Hence, we finally try to figure out how past information W t functions in equilibrium. Figures 11 and 12 are cases in [4] and other Panels are new cases in our economy, which shows the essential difference between the equilibrium driven by Brownian motion and the approximate fBm. On the one hand, the fractional equilibrium prevents investors from benefiting past information and forces them into focusing on current known information and future uncertain information. On the other hand, the fractional equilibrium system (not like investors) pays global attention to information by applying past information (see Figures 11 and 12 or µ t in (3.22) and r t in (3.21)) to maintain the equilibrium in our economy. In the good memory (W t > 0) time, investors should benefit from the increase of the real stock return µ H t (see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 11 or (3.22)) by taking advantages of past information, but the equilibrium system neutralizes such benefit by increasing the interest rate r t (see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 12 or (3.21)). In the bad memory (W t < 0) time, investors should suffer a loss from the decrease of the real stock return µ H t (see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 11 or Figure (3.22) ) because of past information, but the equilibrium system neutralizes such loss by decreasing the interest rate r t (see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 12 or (3.21) ).
Panels (b) in
Furthermore, in the case of W = 0, Figure 12 indicates that the interest rate r t is lower in the economy with poorer investor protection for fixed H. On the one hand, since poorer investor protection decreases the real stock excess return as we have discussed in Figure 9 (c) p = 1 Figure 13 : Interest rate r t with W t = 0 and different indices p (especially the minority shareholder who can not benefit from diverting output) turn to investing bonds with cheaper credit, which then decreases the interest rate. On the other hand, by last two items in (3.21), since poorer investor protection increases the fraction of diverted output x * t as we have discussed in Figure 5 , stock investing could be partially covered by the diverted output leading to the decrease of the interest rate. Figure 13 shows that higher H increases the interest rate r t for fixed p. This is because higher H increases the fraction of diverted output x * t as we have discussed in Figure 6 , which is a more dominant effect than the decrease effect of H on the real stock excess return and hence results in the increase of the interest rate.
Conclusions
In this paper, based on the model in [4] with investor protection and Brownian motion, we introduce an approximate fBm to a dynamic asset pricing model in an economy to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection for minority shareholders and memory properties of financial data. Besides a controlling shareholder who diverts a fraction of output, our model also features the good (or bad) memory obtained from the historical realized data in a pathwise way.
In theory, we derive asset price dynamics in equilibria, and through the historical realized data, we establish an approximation scheme with pathwise convergence for the good (or bad) memory of investors on the historical market information, which ensures our theoretical results can be applied to numerical analysis. In numerical analysis, we find that poorer investor protection shall increase stock holdings of controlling holders, decrease stock returns, decrease interest rates, and decrease stock volatilities if ownership concentration is sufficiently high. Furthermore, higher Hurst index shall weaken investor protection and the good/bad memory would increase/decrease both real stock returns and interest rates.
There are several problems which have not been considered in this paper and we leave these as our future work. The driven approximate fBms of the output and the stock may be totally different, which means that investors have different memories for the output and the stock respectively. As we have achieved dealing with the memory for the output, how could we obtain the past information with pathwise convergence from the historical realized price of the stock?
Even in the economy driven by Brownian motion (i.e. H = 1 2 ), there may not exist equilibria under market clearing conditions (3.16)- (3.18) in the economy with extreme parameters. Then how could we deal with such extreme markets? Finally, the convergence rate ((∆t) 1/6 ) of the approximation scheme for W t is very slow and so developing some more efficient approximation schemes for W t remains to be solved.
